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I.   INTRODUCTION
It is conventional wisdom among lobbyists that “glitch bills”1 can
be more controversial than the major legislation that preceded them.
In theory, such bills are rather mundane housekeeping measures. In
practice, they are a sore temptation for lobbyists whose proposals did
not get adopted as part of the prior major legislation.
In 1996, the Legislature adopted a major revision2 to the Florida
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).3 In 1997, the legislature intro-
                                                                                                                   
* Lawyer and legal educator. The author is a frequent commentator on develop-
ments relating to the Florida Administrative Procedure Act and on technology and the law
issues.
1. “Glitch bills” are bills filed the year after major legislation is enacted so that mis-
takes made in that legislation can be corrected.
2. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, 1996 Fla. Laws 147 (codified in scat-
tered sections of FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (Supp. 1996)); see also F. Scott Boyd, Legislative
Checks on Rulemaking Under Florida’s New APA, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 309, 309 (1997).
This 1996 revision was the most significant change to the APA since its adoption in 1974.
See Jim Rossi, The 1996 Revised Florida Administrative Procedure Act: A Survey of Major
Provisions Affecting Florida Agencies , 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 283, 283 (1997).
3. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1997).
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duced a glitch bill4 to follow the major 1996 revision of the APA.5 It
also marked the ninth straight legislative session in which signifi-
cant revisions to the APA were either seriously discussed or
adopted.6
This Article reviews both the highlights of the glitch bill and the
largely unsuccessful clamor for further administrative procedure re-
form during the past legislative session. In the process, the potential
agenda for future legislative efforts will be examined. Part II dis-
cusses agency policy as it relates to rule repeals and required rule-
making. Part III examines the technical revisions made to the APA
by the 1997 glitch bill. Part IV discusses several proposals that were
not adopted in the glitch bill. Finally, Part V concludes by explaining
that the Legislature should not tinker with the APA until the effects
of current changes can be assessed.
It appears that the adoption of so many changes to the APA in the
1996 session encouraged more requests for changes during the 1997
session. Only through an exercise of political will were further re-
forms excluded from this year’s bill and, as a result, the glitch stole
Christmas. However, the message from the 1997 session was clear.
The drumbeat for reform will continue, and the seemingly never-
ending search for further administrative procedure reform will con-
tinue to consume legislative resources. The unanswered question is,
how many times will the APA have to be reformed before the Legis-
lature can move on to more substantive concerns? Is this level of
legislative activity concerning administrative procedure in propor-
tion to the interests that the people of Florida have in administrative
procedure, or the importance they would place on changing adminis-
                                                                                                                   
4. See Fla. SB 1066 (1997).
5. See Fla. S. Comm. on Gov’t Reform & Oversight, SB 1066 (1997) Staff Analysis 1
(Mar. 25, 1997) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter SB 1066 Staff Analysis].
6. In 1991, to address unclear agency policies, the Legislature amended the APA to
require agencies to adopt their policies as rules and to better index their orders. See Pat-
ricia A. Dore, Florida Limits Policy Development Through Administrative Adjudication
and Requires Indexing and Availability of Agency Orders, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 437, 439
(1991). In September 1992, the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Reform was
formed to “focus on ‘improving the effectiveness and efficiency of state government.’” Sally
Bond Mann, Reforming the APA: Adventures in the Labyrinth, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 307,
317 (1994) (quoting a letter from Senator Pat Thomas, Pres. Pro Tempore, to Senator
Charles William, Chair, Senate Select Committee (Sept. 14, 1993) (on file with author)). In
November 1992, the House Select Committee on Agency Rules and Administrative Proce-
dures formed to “‘encourage greater citizen input’ in the rulemaking process and to inves-
tigate whether agencies ‘stray from legislative intent’ in the promulgation and enforce-
ment of rules.” Id. at 309. Nothing passed in 1993 or 1994, but APA reform was the focus
of much attention as many proposals to amend the APA were introduced. See Stephen T.
Maher, Getting Into the Act, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 277, 278 (1994). In 1995, the Legisla-
ture passed a bill amending the APA, but the Governor vetoed it. See Rossi, supra note 2,
at 287-88. In 1996, the Legislature passed a major revision of the APA, and the Governor
signed it. See id. at 288.
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trative procedure as a legislative priority? Probably not.7 Why has
administrative procedure taken its place with crime, education, and
taxes as a perennial legislative issue? It is not because the populace
is clamoring for administrative procedure reform. The answer may
be that administrative procedure has become a scapegoat for politi-
cal sins. Repeated attempts to revise the APA have become a substi-
tute for more substantive action to address problems with adminis-
trative government.
A.   Substance v. Procedure
Substantive changes tend to meet substantive opposition. Proce-
dural changes tend not to draw the kind of quick and firm opposition
that proposals to change statutes like the Growth Management Act
might encounter, even though procedural changes can have sub-
stantive effects.8 The substantive effects of procedural changes are
harder to quantify, and therefore easier to pass over opposition, than
changes to substantive law. For the same reason, the substantive
benefits of procedural change may be illusory, or at least unpredict-
able and uneven.
Perhaps success in amending the Florida APA can be held as
proof that something is being done about the problems of adminis-
trative government. However, the problems with continually
amending the Act are that the Legislature may be looking in the
wrong place for solutions to constituent concerns, and in the process
of repeated change, it may tend to lose sight of the big picture. The
big picture in administrative procedure is the preservation of the
proper balance between underlying values that the Act reflects.9 The
big picture tends to be lost when legislators repeatedly focus on the
latest reform proposals.
                                                                                                                   
7. Interest groups such as the Florida Chamber of Commerce, who espouse keen
constituent interest in administrative procedure reform, assume that concern about gov-
ernment red tape equates to an interest in administrative procedure reform. Committee
hearings held over the last several years to consider administrative law reform indicate
that complaints usually concern substantive decisions made by agencies with which they
disagree, not the process used to reach those decisions. See Maher, supra note 6, at 282;
see also David Gluckman, 1994 APA Legislation: The History, the Reasons, the Results, 22
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1994) (explaining that “[t]here was a strong sense that this
committee was formed to correct a number of preconceived problems, many of which ei-
ther did not exist or had little to do with the APA”).
8. David Gluckman has suggested that the “implementation of the Growth Man-
agement Act in the rural counties was the strongest single trigger of interest in the APA.”
Gluckman, supra note 7, at 349. I agree that substantive concerns like these have tended
to drive interest in amending the APA. See Maher, supra note 6, at 278-79.
9. The APA reflects the chosen balance between maintaining efficiency in govern-
ment and assuring that agency decisions are made fairly and accurately and are recog-
nized as legitimate. See Stephen T. Maher, Administrative Procedure Act Amendments:
The 1991 and 1992 Amendments to the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 20 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 367, 367 (1992).
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Reform has been used very loosely in this context in the last few
years. It has come to mean the latest proposal for change, not neces-
sarily a positive improvement. Proposals made by the executive
branch tend to focus on freeing the executive from the procedural re-
quirements of the act. To them, that is reform. When the legislative
branch and regulated interests talk about reform, they are usually
advocating the opposite course. They are usually trying to further
burden executive action with even more procedural requirements.
Recent reform efforts have vacillated between these two positions.10
Perhaps the most radical reform would be to allow a session or two
to pass without any discussion of administrative procedure reform.
That is one reform with a great deal of merit.
II.   THE 1996 AMENDMENTS
A.   Public Reaction and the Nonexistent Counterrevolution
The 1996 amendments to the APA were adopted amid much fan-
fare and self-congratulation.11 All of the politicians involved declared
victory, although the Governor did not get a significant part of what
he wanted in the legislation.12 The lobbyists were even happier. They
had been angling to include their reforms in a major APA bill since
the 1993 session, and they were much in need of something to show
for their work.13 The public’s reaction, if there was any, was hardly
noticeable. Although it may not be politically correct to note the
point, few people outside Capital Circle14 even understood what the
terms “administrative procedure” or “administrative law” de-
scribed.15
Someone just reading the notices might perceive that landmark
legislation had just been enacted. For example, Professor Rossi de-
scribed the 1996 legislation as evidencing a “counterrevolution”
against agency rules:
In their effort to reform Florida’s APA, advocates of flexibility and
rationality were joined by those who fear decisionmaking by non-
majoritarian bodies and by those who simply fear any attempt by
                                                                                                                   
10. See Maher, supra note 6, at 284-87.
11. The signing ceremony was held on the steps of the old Capitol, complete with
speeches and a crowd of well-wishers.
12. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
13. For a brief history of these unsuccessful efforts, see Stephen T. Maher, Five Easy
Pieces on Changing the Florida APA: An Introduction to the Symposium, 22 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 243 (1994); see also Florida Administrative Procedure Act Symposium, 22 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 243 (1994).
14. Capital Circle is Tallahassee’s equivalent to the famous Washington Beltway, of
inside and outside the Beltway fame.
15. This reflection is based upon personal experience, after telling people for over 20
years that I practice administrative law and teach administrative procedure. The most
common response is “What kind of work does that involve?”
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government to regulate markets. Much of the growing counter-
revolution against rules has been fueled by regulated interests,
such as developers and industry, who have been dissatisfied with
the outcome of agency regulation.16
According to this account, the 1996 amendments represent a fledg-
ling counterrevolution against required rulemaking fueled by regu-
lated interests. The revolution, requiring agencies to adopt their
policies as written, published rules when it was feasible and practi-
cable to do so, was created by the 1991 amendments to the APA.
However, neither a revolution nor a counterrevolution has oc-
curred. The 1991 amendments were not a revolution, they were a re-
affirmation of the basic policy choices made in the original APA.17
Legislation was necessary because the courts had lost their way in
interpreting the APA’s rulemaking requirements.18 At first, courts
interpreted the rulemaking requirements very strongly, finding that
the failure to adopt policies as rules could be fatal to agency at-
tempts to enforce those policies.19 Over time, the courts softened
their position, and found that the failure to promulgate agency policy
as written, published rules would not necessarily render that policy
invalid or unusable.20 That case law reduced the ability of substan-
tially affected persons to protect themselves from unpromulgated
policy and to force agencies into rulemaking.21 The 1991 amend-
ments were a compromise that found a middle ground between those
two positions, requiring rulemaking without invalidating every pol-
                                                                                                                   
16. Jim Rossi, The 1996 Revised Florida Administrative Procedure Act: A Rulemak-
ing Revolution or Counter-Revolution?  49 ADMIN. L. REV. 345, 358 (1997).
17. See Maher, supra note 9, at 371. Professor Dore also shared this view. See Dore,
supra note 6, at 437; Stephen T. Maher, Patricia Ann Dore and the Florida Administrative
Procedure Act, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 954 (1992). Required rulemaking furthers the
original intent of the Act to “cut down on the private knowledge of the policies which
shape agency decisions which is now possessed only by small groups of specialists and the
agencies’ staffs.” See FLA. ADMIN. PRACTICE at 6 (1979) (App. C) [hereinafter PRACTICE
MANUAL].
18. The APA was adopted in 1974. In 1976, the Florida Supreme Court took a strong
position on the need to adopt policies as rules in Straughn v. O’Riordan, 338 So. 2d 832,
834 (Fla. 1976) (finding that the unpromulgated standards in that case were rules under
the Act and as such were not enforceable against O’Riordan in the absence of publication
in the manner required by law). The First District, apparently following this reasoning,
then decided Department of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA
1977), which invalidated agency policies because they had not been adopted as rules.
However, beginning with McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So. 2d
569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), the First District Court began moving away from this approach,
and by the time the bill that became section 120.353 was under consideration, invalidation
of unpromulgated policy had become a rarity.
19. See Dore, supra note 6, at 437; Maher, supra note 9, at 373.
20. See Maher, supra note 9, at 373. In McDonald v. Department of Banking and Fi-
nance, the court excepted “incipient agency policy” from the rulemaking requirements of
the Act. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 581.
21. See Maher, supra note 9, at 374.
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icy that was not promulgated.22 While required rulemaking surely
represented a radical departure from federal administrative law on
the subject because the federal courts had given federal agencies a
free hand to choose whether or not to engage in rulemaking,23 re-
quired rulemaking was not a radical departure from the way the
original Florida APA requirements were first interpreted.24 In fact,
the required rulemaking amendment adopted in 1991 represented a
somewhat more moderate position than early Florida case law had
established, because it did not invalidate a policy not adopted as a
written, published rule as the early case law did. Instead, it just
provided for a process to force adoption of the policy as a written,
published rule.25
The 1996 amendments did not represent a counterrevolution
against the 1991 amendments that required rulemaking. The most
significant aspect of the 1996 amendments was the fact that, despite
intense lobbying by the executive branch, the Legislature refused to
repeal required rulemaking. This is the strongest evidence possible
of the existence of any counterrevolution against required rulemak-
ing. Yet Professor Rossi hardly mentions this fact.
I also disagree with what I understand to be Professor Rossi’s po-
sition on who supported the repeal of required rulemaking. If he is
suggesting, by arguing that regulated persons are supporting a
counterrevolution against required rulemaking, that regulated per-
sons are the ones who are seeking to drive agency policy out of writ-
ten, published rules, I disagree. The effort to drive policy out of writ-
ten rules is being spearheaded by politicians in the executive branch
of government26 who seek to unfetter their power over regulated in-
terests by removing it from the requirement of rulemaking.27 Logi-
cally, regulated interests should have no part in such efforts because
they are clearly against their interests.
                                                                                                                   
22. See id. at 391.
23. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 267 (1974) (holding that agencies
are generally free to decide whether to proceed by rule or order).
24. The Supreme Court’s decision in Straughn v. O’Riordan, 338 So. 2d 832 (Fla.
1976), not only took a hard line on the duty to promulgate policy as written, published
rules by invalidating policy that had not been properly promulgated, it signaled that was
the original intent of the Act in an interesting way. Justice England, who wrote the opin-
ion, had been the Reporter for the draft APA before serving on the Court.
25. See FLA. STAT. § 120.535 (1995).
26. Professor Rossi agrees that the counterrevolution he describes is executive-led.
See Rossi, supra note 2, at 288.
27. The requirement that agencies adopt their policies as written, published rules
fetters agency discretion by limiting the power of agencies to act in ad hoc, inconsistent,
and arbitrary ways towards regulated interests in similar factual circumstances. Rules
also help fetter agency discretion because they facilitate legislative oversight of agency in-
terpretations of their legislative mandates, because those interpretations are published as
rules and are thus easily available for legislative review.
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B.   Agency Policies Survive Rule Repeals
Repealing published rules does not protect regulated interests
from agency policies. Agency policy can be applied against regulated
interests whether or not it is written in published rules. Policy for-
merly in a written, published rule that has been repealed remains a
rule even after the rule is repealed, so long as the policy does not
change and is still enforced.28 Repeal simply destroys the evidence of
existing policy, making it harder for regulated interests to know and
follow the law. Regulated interests stand to benefit when agencies
are required to adopt their policies as written, published agency
rules.29 Publication makes it easier to know and to follow, or chal-
lenge, agency policy. A written rule that misinterprets a statute may
easily be brought to the attention of legislators. The murkier the
policy, the more difficult it is to either follow it or confront and chal-
lenge it. Published rules also bring discipline to agencies in their
policymaking. To make written, published rules, they must explicitly
make policy choices and state those choices with clarity.
Regulated interests in Florida want written, published rules. Not
only is publication generally beneficial, for the reasons stated, but in
Florida there are special reasons for insisting on the adoption of
agency policy as written, published rules. Florida has the strongest
rule challenge remedy in the United States.30 This means that when
policy is written down and published as a rule, it can be challenged,
either as it is being adopted or afterwards, as an “invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority”31 in specially designed rule challenge
proceedings.32 The rule challenge remedy was significantly strength-
ened by the 1996 amendments, and that was done at the behest of
regulated interests.33 This suggests that regulated interests want
                                                                                                                   
28. The Florida APA defines a rule functionally, so that an unpublished “agency
statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy”
is, by definition, still a rule. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(15) (1997).
29. See Stephen T. Maher, The Death of Rules: How Politics is Suffocating Florida, 8
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 313, 331 (1996).
30. See Stephen T. Maher, We’re No Angels: Rulemaking and Judicial Review in
Florida, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 767, 790 n.113 (1991).
31. Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, defines this phrase as meaning agency
“action which goes beyond the powers, functions, and duties delegated by the Legislature.”
It includes situations where the agency has materially failed to follow rulemaking proce-
dures or requirements; where the agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority;
where the rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the law implemented; where the rule is
vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled dis-
cretion in the agency; where the rule is arbitrary and capricious; where the rule is not
supported by competent substantial evidence; or where the rule imposes regulatory costs
which could be reduced by less costly alternatives that substantially accomplish statutory
objectives. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1997).
32. See id. § 120.56 (establishing rule challenge procedures).
33. The rule challenge remedy was strengthened in the 1996 amendments in several
ways. First, it was strengthened by allowing proposed rule challenges to be filed later in
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policy adopted as written rules and support the continuation of re-
quirements that agency policy be adopted as written, published
rules. Why enhance the remedies available to challenge policy
adopted as written, published rules if agencies can simply circum-
vent those remedies by removing their policies from the published
rules?
I agree with Professor Rossi that “[m]any provisions in the 1996
reforms will make rulemaking more difficult for agencies,”34 but I
disagree that this “seem[s] to be at odds with the 1991 presumptive
rulemaking amendment.”35 Making requirements burdensome is not
at odds with imposing requirements. The adoption of burdensome
rulemaking requirements may or may not be viewed as desirable,
but it is quite consistent with the traditional regulatory balance that
has existed in the Florida APA since its adoption in 1974. Florida
has traditionally had some of the most burdensome rulemaking re-
quirements of any jurisdiction in the nation.36 For good or ill, the
Florida Legislature has made a deliberate policy choice to adopt such
a stance because of its steadfast opposition to executive branch law-
making and its belief that constituents need strong protection from
improper and unresponsive agency rules.37
C.   The Real Problem: When the Executive Branch Ignores Required
Rulemaking
The most important administrative law issue in Florida today is
not the extra burden that the Legislature has placed on the rulemak-
                                                                                                                   
the rulemaking process. See id. § 120.56(2). Special interests had complained that while
the proposed rule challenge was powerful, it was costly to use because a challenge had to
be filed within 21 days of the publication of the proposed rule and before the public hear-
ing. See id. § 120.54(3)(a) (1995). The 1996 amendments changed the time of filing, allow-
ing such challenges to be filed within 10 days after the final public hearing, among other
alternatives. See id. § 120.56(2)(a) (1997). This may save the expense of actually filing a
challenge while retaining the power of the challenge, because it allows regulated interests
the opportunity to threaten to file a proposed rule challenge at the public hearing if their
requested changes are not made. Because the proposed rule challenge is often used as a
bargaining tool, this change has increased the real power of the remedy. Second, the 1996
amendments imposed upon the agency the burden of proving that a proposed rule is not
an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority when challenged. See id. §
120.56(2)(a). Third, the adoption of the so-called map tack provision, which requires that
agencies be able to show specific statutory rulemaking authority for the rules they adopt,
promises to make rule challenges easier to win. See id. § 120.536(1); see, e.g., Calder Race
Course, Inc. v. Department of Bus. and Prof’l Reg., DOAH Case No. 96-0343RP (June 13,
1997) (finding that the fact that a proposed rule is reasonably related to an agency’s duties
is no longer sufficient, and striking down the proposed rule).
34. Rossi, supra note 2, at 304.
35. Id.
36. For example, I observed in 1992 that “[o]ur statutory rulemaking procedure pro-
vides more opportunities to prevent agency encroachment on legislative prerogatives than
does any other administrative procedure act.” Maher, supra note 9, at 368.
37. See Maher, supra note 29, at 345.
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ing process, but the impunity with which the executive branch has
ignored the legislative mandate of required rulemaking. That is a
development that Professor Rossi ignores and that the Legislature
failed to address through legislative oversight of agencies in 1996
and in 1997. It continues today. This trend dilutes every rulemaking
protection in the APA. When an agency adopts rules without prom-
ulgating them as the APA requires, no procedural protection at all is
provided during rule adoption.
1.   The Executive Branch Assault on Required Rulemaking
In the bipartisan euphoria that accompanied the signing of the
1996 amendments, people have forgotten that, just a few short years
ago, administrative law reform was a legislative issue and the ex-
ecutive branch had no viable administrative law agenda.38 What was
worse, the executive branch was not even defending its own battered
bureaucrats when they were, often unfairly, called on the carpet be-
fore legislative committees bent on reforming a bureaucracy some
legislators saw as harming their constituents.39 The executive branch
could have stood up to the call for administrative procedure reform
on the merits. Many of the examples used as evidence of a need for
administrative procedure reform at legislative committee hearings
involved substantive decisions with which legislators disagreed, and
had nothing to do with administrative procedure.40 The Governor
chose not to get involved, and pressure on this issue continued to
mount.41
Prior to the 1994 election, the momentum on this issue was
clearly with the Legislature. The Governor’s position that the bu-
reaucracy needed more discretion and not tighter control42 was get-
ting nowhere in the Legislature. After almost losing the 1994 elec-
tion, the Governor, an astute politician, “got religion” on this issue.
The Governor’s considerable political instincts, awakened on the
campaign trail, told him that people needed a way, other than by
voting against those in power, to vent their frustrations with the
government. His agenda may have come out of Philip Howard’s
book,43 but the Governor’s counterattack was essentially a political
response to growing legislative pressure on this issue. The Governor
found a way to restate his longstanding position on APA issues, that
                                                                                                                   
38. See Maher, supra note 9, at 408-18 (criticizing the Governor’s agenda and con-
cluding that it represented no more than “a round up of the usual suspects”).
39. See Gluckman, supra note 7, at 345-47.
40. See Maher, supra note 6, at 282.
41. See id. at 282 n.14.
42. See Maher, supra note 9, at 409-10.
43. See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFO-
CATING AMERICA (1994).
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the APA should be amended to allow bureaucrats more discretion
and should not hold them in such tight control, in a manner that the
Legislature and the Cabinet, that Democrats and Republicans, all
seem to find irresistible. The Governor’s restatement holds no ana-
lytical power. In fact, it really makes no logical sense. It does, how-
ever, sound great in a stump speech, and it has proven to be an ef-
fective political position, promising all incumbent politicians for-
giveness for their sins.
The Governor’s new formulation of his “more discretion, less con-
trol” position is simple: written rules are the problem.44 The legisla-
tors who authorize the rules and who oversee their implementation,
and the bureaucrats who write the rules and enforce them, are all
blameless. Since rules are the problem, rule books can be held up
and vilified. Because rule books are the problem, those books should
be destroyed. Thus, since the Governor’s war on rules began in 1994,
Florida has seen a “bookburning” of unprecedented proportions. Lit-
erally thousands of written rules have been removed from the Flor-
ida Administrative Code, although most have not ceased to be the
law in Florida.45 This is true because, under Florida law, rules are
defined functionally by their effect, not by what is published in the
Florida Administrative Code.46 Policies that continue to be followed
after the published rules stating them are repealed are still nonethe-
less rules under the law.47
The Governor and Cabinet issued written orders requiring execu-
tive agencies to repeal fifty percent of their rules.48 Executive agen-
cies responded with a mass repeal of agency rules.49
It is easy to see why the Governor’s top legislative priority of the
1996 session in the administrative law area was the repeal of section
120.535, Florida Statutes , which required the adoption of policies ac-
tually being followed by agencies, as written, published rules.50
Based on anecdotal information from agency staff members with
                                                                                                                   
44. The restatement of the classic excuse that “the devil made me do it” in this con-
text is that “the rules made me do it.”
45. See Maher, supra note 29, at 329-30, 334.
46. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(15) (1997).
47. See id. Since a rule “means each statement of general applicability that imple-
ments, interprets, or prescribes law or policy,” the removal of the statement from the
Florida Administrative Code does not repeal the rule if the statement is still being fol-
lowed.
48. See Maher, supra note 29, at 321-28.
49. See id. at 328-30; see also Rossi, supra note 2, at 287. It has gotten so bad that a
friend who used to work in an agency and is now in private practice confided that he uses
his 1994 rule book when he deals with his old agency because it more completely sets out
existing agency policy than does the 1997 version.
50. See FLA. STAT. § 120.535 (1995) (requiring that “[e]ach agency statement defined
as a rule under s. 120.52(16) shall be adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided by s.
120.54 as soon as feasible and practicable”).
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whom I have spoken, and who refuse to go on record, for years the
Governor has orchestrated agency noncompliance with that re-
quirement in the hope of winning its repeal.51 Despite his best ef-
forts, the Governor failed to win the repeal of required rulemaking.
Because he has created such a staggering degree of noncompliance
with required rulemaking in the hope of securing its repeal, the Gov-
ernor’s defeat on this issue was the most significant, if least dis-
cussed, aspect of the 1996 amendments. The Governor had to accept
defeat on this issue because he did not have the votes to stop an
override of his veto of the 1995 amendments, an event that was
threatened, and that would have occurred, if he had not come to
terms with the Legislature on a 1996 APA bill. The Legislature was
in no mood to repeal required rulemaking.
The Governor’s efforts to secure the repeal of section 120.535,
Florida Statutes , were substantial. The Legislature’s refusal to re-
peal the requirement was one of the chief reasons the Governor ve-
toed the 1995 amendments to the APA.52 He then hand-picked a
commission to study the issues and make recommendations to the
Legislature, fully expecting his commission to back his call for a re-
peal of required rulemaking.53 However, even his hand-picked com-
missioners would not vote to repeal this requirement.54 The best the
Governor could muster was the adoption of a rule waiver provision,55
and the enactment of a simplification bill that reworded and reor-
ganized the APA so as to disperse section 120.535, Florida Statutes ,
to the four corners of the APA.56 Required rulemaking is still part of
the APA, even though the requirement is sometimes referred to as
“the former 535” because it has been sliced and diced so effectively
during “simplification.” This cosmetic surgery has not solved the
                                                                                                                   
51. For years the Governor’s Office followed up its executive order with phone calls to
agencies designed to secure their compliance with the 50% reduction quota.
52. See Veto of Fla. CS for CS for SB 536 (1995) (letter from Gov. Chiles to Sec’y of
State Sandra B. Mortham, July 12, 1995) (on file with Sec’y of State, The Capitol, Talla-
hassee, Fla.); Maher, supra note 29, at 339-41; see also Governor Vetos APA Bill, ADMIN.
L. SEC. NEWSL., (Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.), Sept. 1995, at 1-3.
53. Senate Bill 536, which was vetoed by the Governor, called for a commission ap-
pointed by the Governor, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House. See
SB 536 (1995). The Governor’s Administrative Procedure Act Revision Commission was
appointed by the Governor alone.
54. See GOVERNOR’S ADMIN. PROC. ACT REVISION COMM’N, FINAL REPORT (1996).
55. See Act effective May 29, 1997, ch. 97-176, § 3, 1997 Fla. Laws 3318 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 120.542 (1997)).
56. See id. Section 120.535 has been dispersed to the four corners of the Act, but still
remains viable, even though it is now harder to find. Parts of the old 120.535 can be found
in sections 120.54(1), 120.56(1) and (4), and 120.595(4), Florida Statutes. I opposed the call
to simplify the APA. See Maher, supra note 29, at 341-46. Given the Governor’s longstand-
ing opposition to some provisions in the APA, I have always suspected that the driving
force behind “simplification” of the APA was not the desire to make it more readable. Pro-
fessor Rossi notes that even after the face lift, the APA “will still rank low on the average
citizen’s summer reading list.” Rossi, supra note 2, at 289.
246 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:235
Governor’s problem. The thousands of repeals he orchestrated re-
main indefensible today because this requirement has not been re-
pealed.
The Governor and Cabinet have been fortunate that, thus far,
their rule repeals have not required much defense. No state officials
have complained about the failure to follow the law in this regard,
and no complaints are likely. Elected officials like being able to
blame the rules for their own failings. Bureaucrats who disagree
with the fifty percent rule repeal policy have decided that discretion
is the better part of valor, and have registered their disapproval
through creative rule repeal. For example, bureaucrats have consoli-
dated several rules into one rule to meet rule repeal quotas, rather
than through outright criticism or defiance.57 No politicians have
been confronted on this issue by the media. Indeed, the media seem
completely oblivious to this problem. Private litigants have thus far
not pushed the issue too hard. Additionally, the courts have recently
made it more difficult to bring private challenges to the legality of
rule repeals, a development that has undoubtedly brought much re-
lief to the executive branch.58
2.   Ten Thousand Repeals and Nowhere to Turn
In Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Florida, Inc. v. Florida
Manufactured Housing Association, Inc .,59 mobile home owners and
the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation,
Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes
(Agency) sought to repeal an agency rule that they believed had been
interpreted by the First District Court of Appeal in a manner unfa-
vorable to mobile home owners.60 The rule governed the circum-
                                                                                                                   
57. One good example of this trend is the consolidation of three rule chapters into
one by the Florida Housing Finance Agency. See 22 Fla. Admin. W. 2832-62 (May 10,
1996) (repealing chapters 9I-33, 9I-34, and 9I-35 and creating chapter 9I-48). This reor-
ganization turned 46 rules into 32 rules, one with 100 subparts. The reason given for this
change was not to reduce the number of rules, but, “to establish a more efficient provision
of procedures” applicable to the different programs combined into one chapter. Id. at 2833-
35.
58. The degree of relief can only be fully understood when the numbers are exam-
ined. Between January 1, 1997, and October 3, 1997, there were 1428 repeals out of a to-
tal of 3211 rule actions. In 1996, there were 3482 repeals out of a total of 7035 rule ac-
tions. In 1995, there were 5775 repeals out of a total of 10,198 rule actions. Thus, in the
last several years there were more than 10,000 repeals. This represents the majority of
the 19,667 repeals (out of 112,213 rule actions) from 1975 to October 3, 1997. Those re-
peals do not represent radical changes in the substantive law established by rule. They
represent a decision by government not to follow the law, which requires most policies to
be adopted in written, published rules.
59. 683 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
60. See id. at 588-89.
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stances under which changes could be made to the prospectus.61 The
Manufactured Housing Industry Association (Association) was
fighting to keep the rule in place.62
The Association challenged the repeal by filing a section 120.54(4)
rule challenge against the repeal in the Division of Administrative
Hearings (DOAH), and by joining that challenge with a section
120.535 challenge.63 These section numbers have all changed with
the adoption of the newest version of the APA in 1996, but the sub-
stance of the law has not changed.64 The Association argued that the
proposed rule was invalid because it was an invalid exercise of dele-
gated authority in two respects.65 First, the repeal, in trying to
change the law, conflicted with court interpretations that everyone
assumed had established the law in a pro-industry posture.66 Second,
the repeal failed to establish adequate standards for agency deci-
sions and vested unbridled discretion in the agency.67
The court began its analysis by stating:
While section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes (1993), provides that
the term “rule” “includes the amendment or repeal of a rule,” there
are no reported Florida decisions addressing whether that provi-
sion makes the repeal of any rule subject to rulemaking challenge,
or simply entitles interested parties to seek repeal of a rule in
rulemaking proceedings, and to receive notice of amendments and
repeals as required by section 120.54(1), thus permitting a chal-
lenge when the repeal has the corollary effect of creating a new
rule.68
The suggestion that rule repeals are not clearly rulemaking under
the Act, subject to all the procedural requirements and protections of
the Act, including the ability to file proposed rule challenges against
repeals, is not only unprecedented, it is contrary to the plain lan-
guage of the Act and to the policies that underlie the Act. The lan-
guage of the Act is clear. The statutory definition of the term “rule”
                                                                                                                   
61. A prospectus is an important document that must, under chapter 723, Florida
Statutes, be given to a mobile home owner when the owner moves in to a mobile home
park.
62. See Mobile Home, 683 So. 2d at 589. As it turned out, the court found that none of
the parties correctly interpreted earlier First District Court precedent. The court inter-
preted its own precedent not to have the pro-industry effect that everyone had assumed.
See id. at 593. The Agency and the owners thus lost the battle (the repeal was found inva-
lid) but won the war (the rule was not in need of repeal for them to prevail, given the
court’s reading of precedent). See id.
63. See id. at 588.
64. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, § 16, 1996 Fla. Laws 181 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1995)).
65. See Mobile Home, 683 So. 2d at 590.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. Id.
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states that rule “includes the amendment or repeal of a rule.”69 Also,
there is clear direction, outside this definition section, that repeals
are to be treated in the same procedural manner as rule adoptions.
Section 120.54(3)(d)5, Florida Statutes ,70 states “After a rule has be-
come effective, it may be repealed or amended only through the
rulemaking procedures specified in this chapter.”71
The policy behind including repeals as rules, and treating both in
the same procedural manner, is strong. An agency’s decision to re-
peal a rule can have as much, or more, impact on a substantially af-
fected person than the decision to adopt a new policy. The same con-
cerns about accuracy, acceptability, and efficiency that underlie all
rulemaking are also concerns regarding the repeal of rules. There is
no logical reason to limit the assurance of procedural regularity that
the Act requires in rulemaking only to rule adoptions. It should be
equally required in all rulemaking activity. To my knowledge, never
before has anyone suggested that rule repeals do not have to be no-
ticed, processed, and adopted in the same way as rules.72 To my
knowledge, for twenty-three years everyone has acted as if all rule
repeals are subject to the APA in all respects.
The court continued:
To constitute “rulemaking” a rule repeal is required to satisfy in-
dependently the remainder of the definition of a “rule” in section
120.52(16): “agency statement of general applicability that imple-
ments, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the or-
ganization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency. . .” A
repeal that does not have the effect of creating or implementing a
new rule or policy is not a “rule” subject to challenge.73
How can the court require a repeal to independently satisfy the re-
quirements within the definition of a rule when the definition itself
states that the term rule “includes the . . . repeal of a rule”?74 The
quoted analysis is clearly wrong.75 The court suggests that the
“includes” language might have some lesser effect than making the
repeal a rule. It explains that the “includes” language “simply enti-
tles interested parties to seek repeal of a rule in rulemaking proceed-
ings, and to receive notice of amendments and repeals as required by
section 120.54(1).”76 However, this analysis gives no effect whatso-
                                                                                                                   
69. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(15) (1997).
70. This section was formerly found in section 120.54(13)(b), Florida Statutes .
71. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(d)5 (1997).
72. Except those rules that are, by statute, subject to a modified process.
73. Mobile Home, 683 So. 2d at 590-91. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16) (1995).
74. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(15) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
75. This conclusion is further reinforced by developments during the 1997 legislative
session. See discussion infra Part III.
76. Mobile Home, 683 So. 2d at 590.
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ever to the “includes” language, because sections 120.54(1) and
120.54(5), Florida Statutes , (which provide the method for seeking
repeal of a rule alluded to by the court) both mention repeals by
name.77
Under the court’s interpretation, must repeals of this kind even
go through the rulemaking process? The court has concluded that no
proposed rule challenge can be brought against such rules.78 Must a
rulemaking hearing be held upon request? Must any other step be
taken to adopt the repeal as a final rule, other than the notice re-
quired in section 120.54(1)? Not according to the court’s analysis.79
The other rulemaking requirements in the APA are for rules and do
not specifically mention repeals, and the court has determined that
repeals of this kind are not rules.80
Thus, it appears that under the court’s interpretation of the stat-
ute, rule repeals that do not create or implement a new rule or policy
are not rules and therefore cannot be reviewed by the Legislature’s
Joint Administrative Procedure Committee (JAPC).81 It also appears
that, according to Mobile Home, rule repeals need not be adopted as
rules after they are noticed for repeal.82 Moreover, it appears rule re-
peals will no longer be the subject of rulemaking hearings of any
kind, and cannot even be published in the Florida Administrative
Code, which is reserved for adopted rules. This is a clear departure
from the way rule repeals have been handled by the executive and
legislative branches of government for twenty-three years.83
                                                                                                                   
77. The APA makes specific reference to “repeals” in several rulemaking contexts in
the 1996 amendments. There are specific references to repeals in section 120.54(3)(a)(1)
(the old 54(1)); section 120.54(3)(b)(1) (statement of estimated regulatory cost); section
120.54(3)(b)(2) (the small county, small city, and small business impact consideration);
section 120.54(3)(d)5 (discussed above); and section 120.54(5) (the old 120.54(7)).
78. See Mobile Home, 683 So. 2d at 591 (concluding that “[a] rule repeal that does not
have the effect of creating or implementing a new rule or policy is not a ‘rule’ subject to
challenge”).
79. There is a good argument that “intended action” language in section
120.54(3)(c)(1) includes repeals and would require a rulemaking hearing on all repeals if
requested. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(c)(1) (1997). That language comes from section
120.54(3)(a)(1), the successor to section 120.54(1), and seems to encompass both adoptions
and repeals in that context. That language is repeated in section 120.54(3)(c)(1), the suc-
cessor to old section 120.54(3), the section that governs rulemaking hearings. Thus, a good
argument could be made that, despite the Mobile Home ruling, there still is a right to a
rulemaking hearing in connection with all repeals. However, under the logic of Mobile
Home, no further action would be required. See Mobile Home, 683 So. 2d. at 593.
80. See Mobile Home, 683 So. 2d. at 591.
81. The JAPC is charged with examining proposed and existing rules.
82. This is because only rules must be adopted and, according to Mobile Home, re-
peals are not rules.
83. To my knowledge, rule repeals are being handled the same way by the Secretary
of State’s office and the JAPC after the Mobile Home decision as they were handled before
the decision was announced.
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If agencies should decide to follow this precedent, and notice but
do not adopt certain repeals, how will the executive and legislative
branches respond? The Secretary of State and the JAPC have rou-
tinely been involved in the day-to-day assurance that agencies are
following the rulemaking requirements of the Act. If called upon to
do so, they will find the First District Court’s test a difficult one to
enforce. Whether a rule repeal will, or will not, have the effect of cre-
ating or implementing a new rule or policy cannot necessarily be de-
termined on the face of the rulemaking materials that are required
by statute to be submitted with the rule repeal. The court in Mobile
Home reached the conclusion that the repeal there had such an effect
after two paragraphs of analysis with the benefit of a hearing offi-
cer’s findings made after a trial.84 How can the Secretary of State
and the JAPC hope to determine whether an agency is properly no-
ticing but refusing to adopt its repeal without benefit of such re-
sources? The unworkable situation the court’s construction will cre-
ate is one more reason for concluding that the court’s analysis is
wrong.
3.   The Result: Rule Repeals Increase
This judicial hostility towards statutory protections in rule re-
peals is not only illogical and unprecedented, it could not come at a
worse time. One of the most distinctive features of the administra-
tive law landscape over the past few years has been an unusually
large volume of rule repeals. In 1995, for the first time since the
Florida APA was adopted in 1974, the majority of rules noticed for
adoption were rule repeals, not new rules.85 To put that fact in
clearer perspective, there were 5777 rules noticed for repeal in 1995;
there had been only 8627 rule repeals during the previous twenty
years.86 This reversal of a twenty-year trend was no accident. Rule
repeal has become a political imperative, the politician’s way of dem-
onstrating that they are tough on red tape. Both the Governor and
the Cabinet have established rule repeal quotas and have worked
with agencies, by letter and telephone, to make those quotas produce
results.
In this respect, the rule repeal at issue in Mobile Home was not
typical of the kinds of repeals that have been common in recent
years. Most rule repeals in recent years have not sought to change
the law. Rules have been repealed for political reasons, so elected of-
ficials could crow about the large number of agency rules they have
repealed. These repeals are precisely the kind of repeals that Mobile
                                                                                                                   
84. See Mobile Home , 683 So. 2d at 591.
85. See Maher, supra note 29, at 313, 328.
86. See id.
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Home, if followed, will insulate from challenge. Ironically, after
making its analysis, the Court found that the challenger in the Mo-
bile Home case properly challenged the repeal under section 120.54.
The case hits hardest where protection is needed most—where the
administrative process is being manipulated for political reasons.
One consistent legal weakness in the flood of recent rule repeals
is the published explanations of why the rules are being repealed.87
These statements rarely explain the real reasons for the rule’s re-
peal. In many cases, the rules are being repealed to meet Governor-
and Cabinet- imposed rule repeal quotas, but that is often not men-
tioned. The statements also usually fail to indicate that the policy
expressed in the repealed rule will continue to remain in force as an
unpublished rule. Yet that has very often been the reality. Instead,
the repeals generally explain that the rule is unnecessary, or some-
thing along those lines, even though that conclusion is not legally
correct. Legally, where the policy that was in the rule will still re-
main in effect after repeal, the law still requires that such unprom-
ulgated rule policy be adopted as a written, published rule.88 Agency
reticence in this area is understandable. If an agency is repealing a
rule that it intends to continue to follow as an unpublished policy
and it explains that fact in its rulemaking materials, the rule repeal
should be invalid on its face.
Before Mobile Home, I always assumed that any repeal could be
successfully challenged pursuant to section 120.54(4), Florida Stat-
utes, if the materials submitted with the repeal contained inaccurate
statements concerning the reasons for the repeal. I also assumed
that any appeal could be successfully challenged if accurate state-
ments in the repeal materials showed that the agency intended to
use the repeal to circumvent the APA rule adoption requirement.
This included even when no change in policy was intended. This as-
sumption was based on the language of section 120.52(8), Florida
Statutes, which defines an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority, and describes what is subject to invalidation through the
Act’s rule challenge remedies.89 Providing inaccurate or untrue in-
formation in the rulemaking materials required by section
120.54(3)(a)4., should be considered to be a material failure to follow
the Act’s rulemaking procedures and a basis for invalidating a rule.90
Similarly, I viewed an admission that the purpose of the rule repeal
was to remove rule policy from the Florida Administrative Code so
that it could be followed as an unpromulgated rule, as an admission
                                                                                                                   
87. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a)(1) (1997). These explanations are located in the de-
tailed written statement of the facts and circumstances justifying the proposed rule.
88. See supra text accompanying note 56.
89. See FLA. STAT. § 120.56(8)(a) (1997).
90. See id.
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that the repeal was designed to circumvent established rule-making
procedures.91 Thus, the rule that results fails to establish adequate
standards for agency decisions,92 and the attempt should be struck
down as arbitrary and capricious.93 This is especially true when an
agency admits that it is repealing a rule to meet the fifty percent re-
peal requirements of the Governor’s executive orders.94
I still believe that challenges such as these should be permitted.
However, the First District Court of Appeal will apparently not allow
a proposed rule challenge in cases where the rule repeal does not
create or implement a new rule or policy, even when the rulemaking
materials accompanying a rule repeal are clearly false.95 The Court
will also apparently not allow a challenge when an agency admits in
its rulemaking materials that the purpose of the repeal is to circum-
vent the rulemaking requirements of the Act.96 These are precisely
the kinds of cases where a preenforcement remedy like a proposed
rule challenge is most valuable. Hopefully, one of the other district
courts will hear this issue and interpret the statute in a manner that
will give the Supreme Court of Florida an opportunity to straighten
out the law in this area.
In Mobile Home, the court also reminded the bar that, in the First
District Court, there can be no claim that the repeal is invalid under
the theory that the non-rule policy of the agency enlarges, modifies,
or contravenes the specific provisions of the law the rule was in-
tended to implement. The court stated:
In [Christo], the appellant had asserted that unpromulgated
agency rules were invalid under both sections 120.535 and 120.56.
The hearing officer held that there was no violation of section
120.56 “because the manuals did not enlarge, modify or contravene
the specific provisions of law they were intended to implement.”
However, this court held that “the Legislature, in enacting section
120.535, intended section 120.535 to be used as the exclusive
method to challenge an agency’s failure to adopt agency state-
ments of general applicability as rules.”97
                                                                                                                   
91. See id.
92. See id. § 120.52(8)(d). The standards would be inadequate in the sense that the
rule that results from the repeal is unwritten and thus harder to locate and apply.
93. See id. § 120.52(8)(e).
94. See Maher, supra note 29, at 337 (“The whole concept of a fifty percent repeal is
more of a publicity stunt than a rational approach to reducing regulation. I believe that
this uniform rule repeal quota is per se arbitrary and capricious.”).
95. See supra text accompanying note 73.
96. See supra text accompanying note 78.
97. Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Florida, Inc. v. Florida Manufactured
Housing Ass’n, Inc., 683 So. 2d 586, 590 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citations omitted)
(discussing Christo v. Florida Dep’t of Banking and Fin., 649 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA
1995)).
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The First District Court’s conclusion that the Legislature in-
tended section 120.535, Florida Statutes , to be the exclusive method
to challenge non-rule policy is certainly not the only way to read the
statutes. Section 120.56 has not been effectively limited by the legis-
lation that added section 120.535 to the APA.
While section 120.535(8) provides that “[a]ll proceedings to deter-
mine a violation of [section 120.535(1)] shall be brought pursuant
to this section,” it is still not clear whether relief is also available
to challenge unpromulgated rules through section 120.56. It is
possible that section 120.535 is not the exclusive remedy available
under the APA to respond to an unpromulgated rule. The section
120.56 rule challenge may still be available to invalidate an un-
promulgated rule on the basis that it has not been adopted
through the formalities of section 120.54. While the Legislature
may have intended to make section 120.535 the exclusive method
to deal with this problem, it has not made the legislative adjust-
ments necessary to accomplish this result. Section 120.52(8) still
defines an “[i]nvalid exercise of delegated legislative authority,”
the operative language in section 120.56, to include situations
where “[t]he agency has materially failed to follow the applicable
rulemaking procedures set forth in s. 120.54.”98
Thus, there may be a way to read the two sections together to give ef-
fect to both.
Perhaps the section 120.56 rule challenge is still available to in-
validate unpromulgated rules, subject to the defense that the
challenged policy is not a rule, but rather an incipient policy. Thus,
even if section 120.56 has vitality in this area, it has a very narrow
reach. Section 120.535 may have a broader reach as it is available
against all agency policy, even incipient policy.99
Such a distinction harmonizes the sections, giving effect to both and
leaving the section 120.56 remedy strong but narrow and the section
120.535 remedy broad but weak.100
This reading is consistent with the intent of the 1991 amend-
ments that added section 120.535. That legislation was enacted to
force recalcitrant agencies into rulemaking, not to give them a new
way to avoid being forced to follow legal requirements.101 Agencies
that still rely on unpromulgated but fixed agency rules should know
better by now, and should have that policy invalidated. In recent
years, agencies have intentionally been creating unpromulgated but
                                                                                                                   
98. Maher, supra note 9, at 399-400.
99. Id. at 400-401.
100. The remedy is weak because rather than invalidate policy, it merely forces the
agency to initiate rulemaking or cease reliance on the policy.
101. See Dore, supra note 6, at 439.
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fixed agency rules through massive rule repeals.102 Being thrown into
the section 120.535 briar patch is hardly a punishment that agencies
will fear enough to think twice when they are told by the Governor
and the Cabinet to remove the evidence of established rules from the
Florida Administrative Code in order to create some impressive sta-
tistics for a campaign speech.
The level of repeal that the politicians have sought to achieve—
repeal of fifty percent of agency rules—cuts deep into the heart of es-
tablished rule policy, except in those agencies that have been grossly
negligent in keeping their published rules up to date. Newer vol-
umes of the Florida Administrative Code fail to include many rules
that still exist in practice. The mass repeals have created policy ice-
bergs, with large amounts of established rule policy unknown to all
but agency staff and agency insiders, ready to sink passing constitu-
ents without warning.103 Ironically, this is the same situation that
existed when the APA was adopted in the 1970s,104 the situation that
motivated the very rulemaking provisions that the First District
Court has been interpreting as providing no help against this politi-
cal assault. The Governor and the Cabinet are happy with the re-
sults. Apparently a great campaign speech is worth this price.
Both the Mobile Home and the Christo cases limit the challenges
that can be brought against rule repeals and the unpromulgated rule
policy that results from the kind of repeals that have occurred on a
weekly basis over the last few years. The real world consequences of
these decisions will be to provide some degree of insulation from
challenge for agencies who ignore the Act’s rulemaking require-
ments. These consequences could have been foreseen, had the court
paid closer attention to the political climate in Tallahassee. Both
decisions were handed down in the midst of the politically motivated
rule repeals that they now serve to protect. The courts are the bul-
wark against the executive branch’s refusal to follow the legislative
mandate embodied in the APA. They must serve as the protector of
the administrative process when it is being manipulated for political
reasons. When they fail to provide such protection, the integrity of
the process is threatened, and the people are left without an effective
remedy.
                                                                                                                   
102. See Maher, supra note 29, at 331.
103. See id. at 334. While it is hard to know how much unpublished rule policy is now
in existence, the fact that more than 10,000 rules have been repealed since January 1,
1995, many, if not most, for political reasons unrelated to policy change, suggests that a
huge volume of unpublished rule policy now exists.
104. “The proposed act will cut down on the private knowledge of the policies which
shape agency decisions which is now possessed only by small groups of specialists and the
agencies’ staffs.” PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 17, at 6.
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III.   THE GLITCH THAT STOLE CHRISTMAS
Senator Charles Williams,105 the sponsor of the 1996 legislation
and the member most responsible for the final form of the bill,
promised in 1996 that the only APA legislation that would be con-
sidered in 1997 would be a true glitch bill.106 He expressed support
for the concept that the 1996 legislation should be given time to work
before it was subject to still further amendment.107 Although many
changes were suggested for inclusion in the bill, Senator Williams
held the line and a glitch bill was passed that was remarkably true
to its name.108 The amendents added many technical revisions. Some
are noteworthy.
A.   Notice Requirements and Negotiated Rulemaking
Section 120.54, Florida Statutes ,109 no longer requires a notice of
rule development when a rule is being repealed “because there is no
need to have rule development for a rule that already is developed
and that is being repealed.”110 The Staff Analysis noted, however, an
intent to leave other procedural protections during repeals in
place.111 The repeal still has to be noticed under section 120.54(3),
Florida Statutes , however, and full opportunity to have public hear-
ings on the wisdom of the repeal or to challenge the legality of repeal
of the rule will arise at that time.112 Thus, the Legislature has ap-
parently rejected, at least in this more informal way, the Court’s
analysis in Mobile Home, and has agreed that rule challenges should
be available during repeals.
The requirement that a preliminary text of the proposed rules be
contained in the rule development notice if one is available has also
been modified.113 The statute now provides an alternative procedure
that allows the agency to state how a person can obtain a prelimi-
nary draft without cost, if one is available.114 This change was a con-
cession made because “[a]gencies indicated that there is a high cost
associated with printing a preliminary draft that is likely to undergo
many changes.”115
                                                                                                                   
105. Dem., Live Oak.
106. Senator Williams made remarks to this effect both during and after the passage
of the legislation that gave rise to the glitch bill.
107. See id.
108. See Act effective May 30, 1997, ch. 97-176, §§ 1-18, 1997 Fla. Laws 3313 (codified
in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1997)).
109. FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1997).
110. SB 1066 Staff Analysis, supra note 5, at 8.
111. See id.
112. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (1997).
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. SB 1066 Staff Analysis, supra note 5, at 8.
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The Legislature also amended the Act to assure that agency
choices made during negotiated rulemaking are not immediately re-
viewable.116 The change clarifies that an “agency’s decision to use ne-
gotiated rulemaking, its selection of representative groups, and ap-
proval or denial of an application to participate in the negotiated
rulemaking process are not agency action.”117 The right to challenge
the proposed rule that emerges from the process is preserved.118
B.   Waiver and Variance
The Legislature added a number of changes to the waiver and
variance provision added in 1996 “to clarify that an agency is
authorized to limit the duration of any grant of a variance or waiver
or otherwise impose conditions on the grant, but only to the extent
necessary for the purpose of the underlying statute to be
achieved.”119 The statute provides for the publication of the disposi-
tion of petitions in the Florida Administrative Weekly , which will
make it easier to follow the waivers and variances being granted and
denied by agencies on a weekly basis.120
The 1996 statute permitted the Administration Commission to
adopt uniform procedural rules governing the grant or denial of
emergency and temporary variances and waivers.121 The new law re-
quires the adoption of such rules and adds the power to adopt rules
for revocation of a waiver or variance.122 The new law also authorizes
expedited time frames, waiver of limited public notice, and limited
comments on a petition for emergency or temporary variances and
waivers.123 The new law also requires an agency to review a petition
and request additional information within thirty days.124
C.   Summary Hearing Procedures
The new law provides that the “original parties,” rather than the
DOAH administrative law judge, have the power to decide whether a
case shall proceed in accordance with the summary hearing proc-
ess.125 This is troubling because the summary hearing process may
                                                                                                                   
116. See Act effective May 30, 1997, ch. 97-176, § 3, 1997 Fla. Laws 3319 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(3) (1997)).
117. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(3) (1997).
118. See id.
119. SB 1066 Staff Analysis, supra note 5, at 10.
120. See FLA. STAT. § 120.542(8) (1997); SB 1066 Staff Analysis, supra note 5, at 11.
121. See FLA. STAT. § 120.542(3) (Supp. 1996).
122. See id. § 120.542(3) (1997).
123. See id.
124. See id. § 120.542(7).
125. See id. § 120.574(1)(c).
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be used collusively to prevent effective participation by intervenors. I
warned about this danger years ago.
For example, if this kind of simplified process were used in a con-
troversial matter where the real dispute was between the parties
and a possible intervenor, could the parties to the proceedings
agree to invoke the simplified process to permit no discovery and
expedite the case to shut out potential intervenors, or to make it
more difficult for intervenors to participate effectively?126
By removing the administrative law judge, the only check on such
abuse from the process, the amendment invites such abuse.
D.   Stay as of Right
The new law made changes to the “stay as of right” provision of
the APA, one of the most important protections that the APA con-
tains for licensed businesses and professionals.127 This provision
guarantees a stay as of right upon filing a notice or petition for judi-
cial review of an agency decision if a business or professional license
is suspended or revoked.128 This section of the statute was added
more than twenty years ago in recognition of the fact that adminis-
trative agencies make mistakes, and that it would be a serious mis-
take to impose career-ending or career-threatening discipline on
most business and professional people until a court has the oppor-
tunity to review the proceedings for fairness and correctness.129 The
statute provides a limited exception for the worst cases, a provision
that allows the denial of a stay where the licensee presents a danger
to the health, safety, or welfare of the public.130
1.   The 1996 Amendments and Substantive Stay as of Right
Changes
In 1995, I wrote an article that criticized the Department of Busi-
ness and Professional Regulation (Department) for failing to follow
the section as it had been interpreted by the courts and calling on
the courts to provide better guidance in this area.131 My criticisms fo-
cused on the procedures the Department used to handle stay re-
quests.
In 1996, the first stage of the general overhaul of the APA in-
cluded the preparation of a simplified APA which, according to all
                                                                                                                   
126. Maher, supra note 6, at 303.
127. See SB 1066 Staff Analysis, supra note 5, at 13.
128. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (1997).
129. See What’s Wrong With the Stay As of Right, ADMIN. L. SEC. NEWSL., (Fla. Bar,
Tallahassee, Fla.), June 1995, at 2.
130. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (1997).
131. See Maher, supra note 129, at 2.
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representations and agreements, would not change the substance of
the APA but would merely simplify its language.132 Unbeknownst to
all but a few representatives of the Department, the simplification
bill was drafted to change the substance of the stay as of right sec-
tion to address the problems I had identified in my article. Section
120.68(3) was changed by amending it to conform with the way that
the Department was handling stay requests.133 No debate occurred
concerning the change, although it is of great importance to all li-
censed business and professional people in the state.134 It is fair to
assume that the legislators who voted in favor of the bill that con-
tained this change did not even know this change was being made.
These events came to light as the glitch bill was being considered.
At a meeting conducted by the Governor’s office to determine what
should be proposed for inclusion in the glitch bill, the assembled
group discovered that these substantive changes had been made to
the simplification bill. This revelation occurred when representatives
of the courts came to inquire why section 120.68(3), Florida Statutes ,
had been changed and a representative of the Department admitted
making substantive changes to the simplification bill. Once the truth
about how the change was made came to light, the argument was
made that a reversal of this change should be included in the glitch
bill. It was indeed a mistake to have allowed the simplification bill to
be used to make substantive changes contrary to all representations
and agreements made about the simplification process. Despite op-
position from those who sought to retain the change, the glitch bill
returned the stay as of right provision to the way it read before the
1996 amendment.135 The provision now reads:
The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the
agency decision, but if the agency decision has the effect of sus-
pending or revoking a license, supersedeas shall be granted as a
matter of right upon such conditions as are reasonable, unless the
court, upon petition of the agency, determines that a supersedeas
would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare
of the state. The agency may also grant a stay upon appropriate
terms, but, whether or not the action has the effect of suspending
or revoking a license, a petition to the agency for a stay is not a
prerequisite to a petition to the court for supersedeas. In any event
                                                                                                                   
132. See APA Review Commission, ADMIN. L. SEC. NEWSL., (Fla. Bar, Tallahassee,
Fla.), Dec. 1995, at 5-6. This revision process was a two-step process by general agree-
ment. Step one was simplification and reorganization of the Act to make it more user
friendly. Step two was the addition of substantive changes. I was a critic of this process.
See The Governor’s Proposed Technical APA Revision, ADMIN. L. SEC. NEWSL., (Fla. Bar,
Tallahassee, Fla.), Dec. 1995, at 1-3.
133. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (1995).
134. No debate occurred because everyone assumed that the simplification process
made no substantive changes to the APA.
135. See SB 1066 Staff Analysis, supra note 5, at 13.
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the court shall specify the conditions, if any, upon which the stay
or supersedeas is granted.136
Despite this clear language, its legislative history, and case law in-
terpreting this section over the last twenty years, there are still im-
portant unanswered questions concerning key aspects of the stay as
of right, and there are disagreements about how those questions
should be answered. Whether and how the stay as of right provision
should be amended is likely to be debated in the 1998 legislative
session.
2.   Suspension and Revocation
While many stays during judicial review are simply agreed to by
the agency, when contests over stays occur they are important to
both the licensee and the regulating agency. Proper construction and
application of the stay as of right provision is critical because liveli-
hood is usually at stake when it is applicable. Many licensees are
professionals and businesses who depend upon licensure to earn
their living. Any interruption of a professional practice or licensed
business operation can have significant adverse consequences. Pro-
fessionals usually have ongoing responsibilities that can be dis-
rupted even by several days of suspension. Licensed businesses that
are not able to operate may see their customers go elsewhere, and it
may be difficult to rebuild customer loyalty after an interruption in
service or product sales. Both a successful professional practice and
a successful licensed business are hard to build and can be seriously
harmed or even destroyed by temporary license suspensions.
This observation is not meant to denigrate the importance of po-
licing professionals and licensed businesses. It merely recognizes the
nature of the interests being policed. Mistakes can be made in the
administrative disciplinary process, and the existence of a stay as of
right seems to recognize the importance of affording a professional or
licensed business judicial review of agency action before suspension
or revocation is actually imposed.
The Legislature’s cautious approach to imposing suspension and
revocation is consistent with a recognition that business people and
skilled professionals practicing in Florida are an important state re-
source and that it usually takes years of training and experience for
an individual to build the skills necessary to succeed in business and
to practice a profession. If the disciplinary process is not sensitive to
the realities of business and professional practice, irreparable harm
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may be done to innocent businesses and professional practices even
before the court reaches a final decision in a case.137
The APA did not always contain a stay as a matter of right provi-
sion. The stay as a matter of right language was added to the APA
by chapter 76-131, Florida Laws.138 The Reporter’s Comments, the
original legislative history of the APA, and the Reporter’s Final
Draft (the draft statute) contained no special treatment for stays of
license suspensions or revocations during judicial review.139 The
draft statutes simply provided that: “The filing of a petition for re-
view does not itself stay enforcement of the agency action. The
agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon ap-
propriate terms.”140 That language was similar to the language ac-
tually adopted in 1974: “The filing of the petition does not itself stay
enforcement of the agency decision. The agency may grant, or the
reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms.”141 The
provision, as adopted, was taken from the 1961 Revised Model State
Act.142
The 1976 amendment added the special treatment for stays of li-
cense suspensions and revocations that is now in place.143 That chap-
ter added the stay “as a matter of right” language now in section
120.68(3).144 The available legislative history of this chapter provides
no indication why the stay as a matter of right provision was added
at that time. However, the amendment clearly manifests an intent to
create a special system, and a special standard, for issuing stays in
the case of license suspensions or revocations that is different from
the one applicable in other situations. Strong public policy reasons
support the issuance of stays in the case of suspensions and revoca-
                                                                                                                   
137. See ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD & MICHAEL ASIMOW, STATE AND FEDERAL AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW 718 (1989) (“If the court refuses a stay, the damage to the petitioner
may be irreparable; even if the petitioner ultimately wins on the merits, it may be too
late.”).
138. Act effective June 15, 1976, ch. 76-131, § 13, 1976 Fla. Laws 230 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 120.68(3) (1975)).
139. See PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 17; see also, FLA. ADMIN. PRACTICE Reporter’s
Final Draft, at 7 (1995).
140. FLA. ADMIN. PRACTICE Reporter’s Final Draft, at 7 (1995).
141. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (1974).
142. See FRANK E. COOPER, 2 STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 627 (1965).
143. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (1997), providing:
(3) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the agency
decision, but if the agency decision has the effect of suspending or revoking a
license, supersedeas shall be granted as a matter of right upon such conditions
as are reasonable, unless the court, upon petition of the agency, determines
that a supersedeas would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or
welfare of the state. The agency may also grant a stay upon appropriate terms,
but, whether or not the action has the effect of suspending or revoking a li-
cense, a petition to the agency for a stay is not a prerequisite to a petition to
the court for supersedeas.
144. See id.
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tions pending judicial review, except in cases where an immediate
danger to health and safety is presented.145
The 1976 amendment made clear that while licensees facing sus-
pension or revocation after completing the administrative process
would not be granted an automatic stay of that discipline, they
would be eligible to apply for what the courts have come to call a
stay as a matter of right.146 What exactly does this mean? The lan-
guage of the provision itself sets out a few points. It indicates that an
application for stay would be required (because the stay is not auto-
matic), but “supersedeas shall be granted as a matter of right,” with
the reasons for denying such a stay limited to those stated in the
statute.147 The amendment places the burden on the agency to
“petition” the “court” to deny the stay, and to demonstrate that su-
persedeas would constitute a “probable” danger to “the health, safety
or welfare of the state.”148 Existing language, providing that the
agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay, was re-
tained.149
That existing language was the subject of the next amendment to
section 120.68(3), which occurred in 1978. The 1978 amendment
amended the last sentence of the 1976 provision:
The agency may also grant, or the reviewing court may order, a
stay upon appropriate terms, but, whether or not the action has the
effect of suspending or revoking a license, a petition to the agency
for a stay shall not be a prerequisite to a petition to the court for s u-
persedeas. In any event, the order shall specify the conditions, if
any, upon which the stay or supersedeas is granted.150
This change was accompanied by a Senate Staff Analysis and Eco-
nomic Impact Statement from the Governmental Operations Com-
mittee that explained that this change: “Provides that an affected
party may petition a court for supersedeas to stay enforcement of fi-
nal agency action without having first petitioned the agency for a
stay.”151
While the legislative materials do not explain why this change
was made at this particular time, the case law does suggest a reason
why this matter was clarified during the 1978 legislative session. On
September 27, 1977, the Fourth District Court denied a motion to
                                                                                                                   
145. See Cooper, supra note 142, at 628.
146. See Act effective June 16, 1976, ch. 76-131, § 13, 1976 Fla. Laws 230 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (1975)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Act effective June 27, 1978, ch. 78-425, § 11, 1978 Fla. Laws 1418 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 120.68(3) (1977)).
151. Fla. S. Govtl. Ops. Comm., SB 860 (1978) Staff Analysis 1 (Apr. 24, 1978)
(available at Fla. Dep’t of State, Div. Of Archives, ser. 18, carton 511, Tallahassee, Fla.).
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stay of a final order made pursuant to section 120.68(3), Florida
Statutes, without prejudice to apply to the agency for a stay.152 The
court’s rationale was that “[t]he statute authorizes either the re-
spondent or this court to enter such a stay.”153 The court indicated its
preference for the agency to be the one to first hear the stay mo-
tion.154 This was the very statutory language changed by the 1978
amendment. This combination of events suggested that the Legisla-
ture was sending a clear message to the courts to hear stay motions
under section 120.68(3) without first requiring application to the
agency for a stay.
Nevertheless, the First District Court of Appeal recently refused
to follow this mandate.155 In an administrative appeal governed by
section 120.68, the court denied a Motion for Supersedeas and Stay
filed in the court because the stay request was not first made to the
agency.156 The court recognized the language of section 120.68(3), but
nevertheless decided that “in most cases we shall continue to adhere
to the general requirement of [Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure]
9.310(a) that an applicant should first seek relief in the lower tribu-
nal.”157 The court’s rationale for this deviation from the statute, was
that:
[b]y doing so, this court will continue to serve in its primary func-
tion as a court of review. The lower tribunal is in a superior posi-
tion to determine whether a bond or other conditions should be re-
quired before an order is stayed and, if so, the amount of the bond
or the nature of the conditions. These determinations may require
fact finding which is not a function of this court.158
First, this rationale is of uncertain validity. Given the differences
between court practice and administrative practice, the legislatively
mandated special treatment of stays in administrative appeals is
understandable. In court practice, the lower tribunal is a court, not a
party litigant. In administrative practice, the lower tribunal is the
same administrative agency that is opposing the issuance of a stay.
Permitting direct access to the appellate court in such a case makes
perfect sense.
Second, this approach often wastes valuable time. Indeed, that
was the case in MSQ Properties v. Florida Department of Health and
                                                                                                                   
152. See Trombley v. Florida Real Est. Comm’n, 356 So. 2d 813, 813 (Fla. 4th DCA
1977).
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See MSQ Properties v. Florida Dep’t of HRS, 626 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 1st DCA
1993).
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Id. This is essentially the same rationale used by the Fourth District Court in
Trombley, the case that the 1978 amendment appears to have been adopted to overrule.
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Rehabilitative Services .159 MSQ followed the court’s direction and
applied to the agency for a stay.160 The agency denied the stay.161 The
court then heard MSQ’s motion to review the agency’s stay decision
and granted it, entering a stay in an unpublished order.162 Such de-
lay may well leave licensed individuals out of work for weeks while
the matter is considered by the agency, denied, and then reviewed by
the court.
Third, the First District Court has no authority to ignore this
statutory requirement allowing direct access.163 The appellate rule
relied upon by the court is not in conflict with the statute. The rule
specifically recognizes that it can be modified by “general law.”164 It
has been so modified in administrative appeals governed by the APA
pursuant to section 120.68(3), Florida Statutes . The Legislature has
made the law clear on this point. The First District Court has failed
to follow it.
Fourth, the problems created by an MSQ Properties approach are
especially serious if this precedent is applied in cases involving a
stay as of right. MSQ Properties was not a stay as of right case. It in-
volved a bid dispute.165 However, the decision itself does not make
that distinction. If MSQ Properties is applied to stay as of right
cases, who will do the fact finding on the “probable danger” showing
required by statute? The Legislature clearly assigned that role to the
courts.166 The statute states that the agency must petition the court
to deny a stay.167 The statute gives the agency no power to deny a
stay as of right based upon concerns about the public health, safety,
or welfare.168 Does the agency even have the authority to deny a
stay? Or does that section limit the agency’s authority to oppose a
stay to submitting a petition to the court which sets forth its opposi-
tion?
The 1978 amendment, which reduces the agency to a “may also
grant” role in the issuance of a stay, confirms the agency’s limited
                                                                                                                   
159. 634 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (reviewing the agency’s denial of MSQ’s mo-
tion for stay).
160. See id. at 287.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (1997).
164. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.310(a) (“Except as provided by general law . . . a party seeking
to stay a final or non-final order pending review shall file a motion in the lower tribunal,
which shall have continuing jurisdiction, in its discretion, to grant, modify, or deny such
relief.”).
165. See MSQ Properties, 634 So. 2d at 287.
166. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (1997) (“[U]nless the court . . . determines that a su-
persedeas would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the
state.”).
167. See id.
168. See id.
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role in the stay process and strengthens the argument that the Leg-
islature intended the court to take the primary role in granting a
stay during judicial review of an administrative matter. The First
District Court’s observation that it is institutionally not equipped for
that primary role because it is not equipped to do fact finding does
raise concerns, but those concerns do not justify ignoring the legisla-
tive mandate.
It is important to note the essence of the court’s concern. Court
involvement is made more difficult by the type of decision to be
made. Stay decisions may involve contested facts and factual dis-
putes require evidentiary proceedings. The facts decided in the final
order under review may or may not alone be enough to show a prob-
able danger to the health, safety, and welfare of the state.169 If the
agency plans to rely on “additional facts showing in what manner
the violations demonstrate an immediate danger to the public,”170 in
order to oppose a stay, shouldn’t those additional facts be found the
same way the other facts in the case have been found, through
hearing, testing, and evaluating evidence? While it has been recog-
nized that “[t]he statute clearly places the onus on the agency to pre-
sent to the court sufficient documentation to overcome the stay as of
right provision,”171 the courts have been less than clear exactly what
this “documentation” must be. Logically, it must be an evidentiary
presentation, either through the facts found below or through some
additional evidentiary proceeding, and the MSQ Properties decision,
for all its other flaws, seems to recognize this.
Second, this potential need for additional fact finding does not
pose an insurmountable procedural obstacle to court involvement.
The problem posed by fact finding can be overcome, in stay as of
right cases, by allowing the appellant the opportunity to apply di-
rectly to the court for supersedeas and stay, and by allowing the
agency opposing a stay to immediately petition the court not to grant
a stay.172 This honors both the stay as of right and petition to the
court language of the statute. It could better protect those with meri-
torious claims for judicial review from interim interruption of their
practice or business while the question of probable danger is liti-
gated, first before the agency and then before the court. The court
might guarantee this by entering a stay pending a resolution of the
                                                                                                                   
169. See discussion supra Part III.D.1.
170. Old Timers Restaurant and Lounge, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Bus. Reg., 483 So. 2d
463, 464-65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
171. Iturralade v. Florida Dep’t of Prof. Reg., 482 So. 2d 375, 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
172. This seems to be the procedure approved by the First District Court. See id. at
376. Assuming MSQ Properties is distinguishable because it does not deal with the stay as
of right situation, it is arguably the controlling procedural authority on stay as of right
cases today.
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agency’s petition, especially if some additional evidentiary presenta-
tion is required.
3.   Suggested Formula to Determine Whether Evidentiary
Proceedings Are Necessary
Procedurally, the court could use the following formula for evalu-
ating whether evidentiary proceedings are necessary in connection
with a stay motion. If the matters alleged by the agency in its peti-
tion, if proven, would not be sufficient to deny the stay, the petition
could simply be denied without evidentiary proceedings. If the mat-
ters alleged would be sufficient if proven, and are factually con-
tested, then the court could remand the matter to the agency for pro-
ceedings pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes , to resolve
the contested factual issues. This would normally allow a DOAH
administrative law judge to hear the stay dispute and to enter a rec-
ommended order to the agency finding the facts and making recom-
mendations on the legal ruling. The neutral hearing officer would be
more equivalent to a “lower tribunal” in civil cases than would the
agency acting without DOAH assistance. Section 120.68(7)(a), Flor-
ida Statutes, is not exactly on point, but could serve as authority and
as a model for such a remand.
What must an agency prove to overcome a stay as of right? There
is surprisingly little case law available to answer this question. The
case law does tell us that where a medical doctor’s license was re-
voked for numerous findings of “acts of malpractice” in the order un-
der review, the First District Court found a basis for denying a stay
as of right based upon danger to health, safety, and welfare.173 On
the other hand, when an agency tried to use Iturralade v. Depart-
ment of Professional Regulation 174 to simply rely on the final order
under review to oppose a stay, the First District Court refused to al-
low such a response.175 First, the court reiterated that the agency
must petition for denial of a stay, not just wait to respond.176 Second,
the court explained that, while there may be cases, like Iturralade,
this is not the usual situation.
Iturralade does not hold that the mere recitation of the violations
for which a licensee has been found guilty will always show a dan-
ger to the health, safety or welfare of the public. While there may
be times, such as certain cases involving medical malpractice,
when the findings of guilt will suffice, such is not always the case.
To hold otherwise would permit denial of the stay in every in-
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stance, effectively nullifying the stay provision of section
120.68(3).177
The violations found in the order under review in Old Timers Res-
taurant and Lounge, Inc., v. Department of Business Regulation 178
were far less threatening to the public than the ones found in Iturra-
lade. In Old Timers, the agency found problems with the way the
business was organized and represented to the agency, and with a
shortage of chairs in the dining room.179 However, there remains a
large uncharted territory between numerous acts of malpractice and
too few chairs in the dining room that needs to be discussed by the
courts in published opinions.
It is clear that in some cases the final order under review may
justify denial of a stay, and in others it may not, but the logic that
should be used to reason the outcomes of the stay as of right cases
that fall in between Iturralade and Old Timers has not been clearly
set out. The statute provides some guidance. It suggests that the
agency must show more than that the continued licensure provides
the opportunity, or the possibility, for wrongdoing.180 The statute
clearly states that the danger must be “probable.”181
How does the agency prove probability? By showing that the order
under review found serious wrongdoing? One problem with this ap-
proach is that every final order that is the subject of a motion for
stay as of right contains findings of serious wrongdoing. Only those
license holders found guilty of the most serious wrongdoing182 are
even entitled to apply for the stay as of right guaranteed by section
120.68(3).183 The Legislature’s provision for a stay as a matter of
right in section 120.68(3) would be rendered meaningless if all an
agency had to do to defeat the stay was to show that the order under
review found serious wrongdoing. If the stay as of right is to have
meaning, some other standard than “serious wrongdoing” must be
used.
In the absence of clear direction from the courts, it appears from
the statute that what an agency should be required to prove is future
dangerousness to have a stay as of right denied.184 This may be quite
difficult to prove based upon one, or even more than one, instance of
wrongdoing. Agencies may be tempted to argue that what the appel-
                                                                                                                   
177. Id.
178. 483 So. 2d. 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
179. See id. at 464.
180. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (1997).
181. Id.
182. That is, wrongdoing resulting in suspension or revocation, rather than lesser
discipline like probation or a fine.
183. See Hunt v. Department of Prof. Reg., 558 So. 2d 156, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
(finding the automatic stay provision inapplicable to probation).
184. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (1997).
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lant did, as proven in the administrative proceedings below, shows
that he is a person of bad character, and that he poses a danger to
the health, safety, or welfare of the state because he will probably act
in conformity with his bad character in the future.
The argument that an individual has a bad character and can be
expected to act in conformity with that bad character in the future
should not be permitted because it is an improper use of character
evidence.185 Character evidence offered in this context is used for an
improper purpose that goes beyond any improper purpose for which
it could be offered in a civil trial. It is used here to argue not that the
individual has acted in conformity with his bad character on a par-
ticular occasion, but that he probably will do so at some time in the
future. This is not only an improper use of character evidence, it is
speculative and of questionable probative value. That kind of evi-
dence should not be permitted to determine the future of a licensed
professional or business person.
The stay as of right may provide the best chance for obtaining a
stay during judicial review, but it is not the only one. While seeking
relief from the circuit courts seems unlikely to bring much success,186
arguing to the district court that constitutional grounds exist for
granting a stay, if the facts of the case support such an argument, is
particularly appropriate because those issues are beyond the compe-
tence of the agency to decide and can be presented to the court for
decision during judicial review.187
After almost twenty years of practice under section 120.68(3), se-
rious unanswered questions about the procedure and substance of
the section remain. Perhaps this is true because agencies rarely con-
test stays pending review in cases involving the suspension or revo-
cation of a license. If courts are denying stays in unpublished orders,
they should share their rationale with the practicing bar so that
when lawyers are representing clients facing what is often the most
serious problem of their professional career, they can proceed with
speed and accuracy to obtain the interim relief necessary to make
judicial review truly meaningful.
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acter is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion [except
in the case of the exceptions enumerated in that section, none of which are applicable
here]”).
186. Application to circuit courts for injunctive relief in such circumstances has been
disapproved. See Department of Bus. Reg. v. Carl & Mike, 425 So. 2d 190, 191 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1983). Attempts to use circuit court receiverships to, in effect, stay a license revoca-
tion have also been criticized. See Department of Bus. Reg. v. Garcia, 446 So. 2d 167, 169
(Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
187. See Carl & Mike, 425 So. 2d at 191 (holding that the appellant was not precluded
from raising appropriate constitutional challenges “before this court and in the corre-
sponding application for stay”).
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IV.   THE UNDELIVERED GIFTS
Several proposals for change were not adopted in the glitch bill,
but may appear on the legislative agenda next year.
A.   Reducing Section 120.57(2) to Writing
One proposal included in the Governor’s working group’s draft of
proposed glitches was a proposed amendment of section 120.57(2),
Florida Statutes .188 This proposed amendment would have changed
the title to delete the characterization of those proceedings as hear-
ings and instead designate them as proceedings.189 Further, this pro-
posal would amend the subsection describing what can be done at
the hearing to add the sentence: “The agency shall determine
whether evidence to be admitted shall be oral or written.”190 This
proposal would have affected proceedings where substantial inter-
ests were being affected by agencies and no material facts were at is-
sue.
This proposal would have allowed the agency to determine
whether or not substantially affected persons would be allowed to
have an oral hearing where no facts are in dispute.191 The proposal
would also have allowed the agency to dispense with oral hearings at
the option of the agency.192 The proposed amendment would have re-
quired no standards for when an oral hearing could be refused, and
would thus seem to allow no review of that determination.
This proposal is quite disturbing. First, this change would create
the anomalous position that, in cases when no facts were at issue, af-
fected persons would have more procedural rights in rule adoption
proceedings than they would in cases where an agency took direct
action against them. Section 120.54(3)(c)(1) guarantees an opportu-
nity to present evidence and argument on all issues in rulemaking,
including an opportunity to present live testimony through a public
hearing.193 The proposed change would allow an agency complete dis-
cretion to deny such a presentation where the person’s substantial
interests were individually affected. This situation is out of harmony
with the balance stuck in every administrative procedure act of
which I am aware. All provide more protection of regulated interests
in adjudication than in rulemaking.
                                                                                                                   
188. See FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1997) [hereinafter Draft].
189. See id. at 25.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(c)(1) (1997); Balino v. Department of HRS., 362 So. 2d
21, 24-25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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Second, this change ignores the reality of section 120.57(2). Sec-
tion 120.57(2) proceedings are sometimes selected erroneously by
unrepresented individuals who do not understand the process.194 The
case law that has developed in this area assures that where a factual
issue appears in the course of a section 120.57(2) proceeding, the
agency must suspend the proceeding and convene a section 120.57(1)
proceeding.195 However, the chances of a factual issue coming out in a
section 120.57(2) proceeding are much reduced if no hearing is held
and the substantially affected person’s participation is reduced to
writing. Thus, some cases that should be heard in section 120.57(1)
proceedings would escape those protections if the proposed change is
made. In addition, unrepresented individuals are likely to be less
articulate in writing than they are in person,196 and are likely to be
less responsive to the real concerns of the agency or board if they are
simply writing a statement rather than responding orally to ques-
tions. All these factors create a disadvantage for persons who are
relegated to a written presentation.
It is hard to come up with a good reason for limiting presentations
in this way.197 This proposed change cannot be advanced as a change
that is in keeping with the overall tone of the APA, because that tone
is to provide more process than is available in other states, not
less.198 Certainly such hearings have been held by agencies for more
than twenty years, and no agency has yet gone bankrupt from the
cost. Indeed, complaints about the cost of 120.57(2) were not raised
during the many hearings on what is wrong with the APA held by
the Legislature over the last several years.
                                                                                                                   
194. Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, is the proper remedy where no material
questions of fact exist. Where material facts are in dispute, a section 120.57(1) proceeding
should be convened.
195. See Mixon v. Department of State, 686 So. 2d 755, 755 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
(explaining that a section 120.57(1) hearing should be convened if, during a section
120.57(2) proceeding, it becomes apparent that there are material facts in dispute); see
also Dixon v. Florida Elections Comm’n, 681 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Iazzo v. De-
partment of Prof’l Regulation, 630 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
196. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). The court did not relegate the
participants to written submissions, but instead required what has become known as wel-
fare fair hearings.
197. The only explanation for the proposal that I have found states:
The working group felt that parts of s. 120.569 were not in total harmony with
the concept of informal proceedings under s. 120.57(2). This can be corrected
by substituting “proceeding” for “hearing” throughout the section and in the
title of s. 120.57(2). A clarification of agencies’ discretion to accept either writ-
ten or oral evidence in informal proceedings is also offered.
Legislature Considers APA Glitch Bill, ADMIN. L. SEC. NEWSLETTER, (Fla. Bar, Tallahas-
see, Fla.), Apr., 1997, at 10. I do not find the characterization of this change as a correc-
tion to be either fair or accurate, given either the history or purpose of this section.
198. See Maher, supra note 6, at 293. (“The 1981 MSAPA . . . provides much less pro-
tection for constituent interests from agency encroachment than the present Florida
APA.”).
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The 1997 amendments did include an amendment to section
120.57(2) that is relevant to this discussion. The amendment states
that an agency shall “[g]ive parties or their counsel the option, at a
convenient time and place, opportunity to present to the agency or
hearing officer written or oral evidence.”199 The Senate staff analysis
is silent as to the reason for this change.200 It might be a reaffirma-
tion that the choice of written or oral presentation is at the option of
either party, thus clarifying the current law that an oral hearing op-
portunity cannot be denied by the agency over opposition from the
substantially affected person. However, there is no clear indication of
the rationale for this change.
B.   The Draw Out Revisited
Another proposed glitch was to amend the draw out provision201 to
change the way that it must be requested and to provide that the na-
ture of the proceeding is a recordmaking proceeding that does not re-
sult in a recommended or final order.202 Since the 1996 amendments
did not address the draw out in a substantive way, it is very difficult
to see how this proposal would be considered to be a glitch.
The draw out is presently available during rulemaking when “a
person timely asserts that the person’s substantial interests will be
affected in the proceeding and affirmatively demonstrates to the
agency that the proceeding does not provide adequate opportunity to
protect those interests.”203 If the agency determines that the rule-
making proceeding is not adequate to protect the person’s interests,
section 120.54(3)(c)(2) provides that it shall suspend the rulemaking
proceeding and convene a separate proceeding under the provisions
of sections 120.569 and 120.57.204 Upon conclusion of the separate
proceeding, the rulemaking proceeding resumes.205
The draw out is unique to Florida.206 It has been the subject of in-
teresting law review commentary207 but unfortunately agencies have
                                                                                                                   
199. FLA. STAT. § 102.57(2)(a)(2) (1997).
200. See SB 1066 Staff Analysis, supra note 5, at 11.
201. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(c)(2) (1997). For a brief history and description of the
draw out, see Maher, supra note 30, at 780-84.
202. See Draft, supra note 188, at 11-12.
203. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(c)(2) (1997).
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Patricia A. Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 967, 1006 (1986).
207. See Patricia A. Dore, Seventh Administrative Law Conference Agenda and Report,
18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 727-32 (1991); Maher, supra note 30, at 780-92, 805-11, 834-
53; Stephen T. Maher, Rulemaking in Florida: An Opportunity for Reflection, FLA. B.J.,
Jan. 1990, at 48, 48-50.
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been generally unwilling to allow the draw out to be invoked and the
courts have not given the proceeding very strong support.208
The draw out should be understood to require a full section
120.57(1) hearing conducted by DOAH that would result in a rec-
ommended order to the agency making findings of fact on the con-
tested factual issues in the rulemaking. Furthermore, as a remedy,
these findings should be binding on the agency the same way that
findings made by DOAH in an adjudication would be binding. The
point of the remedy is to limit agency discretion to find facts in rule-
making, and that is why agencies almost never allow it to be in-
voked.209 Not everyone agrees with this analysis, and the remedy is
so rarely invoked or litigated that there are no real definitive an-
swers concerning how the remedy is to be conducted.
As I look back over the last twenty-two years of administrative
practice, the most valuable contribution of the draw out has been to
force agencies to be generous in the manner that they conduct rule-
making hearings. The agencies fear that if they are less than gener-
ous in the way they permit participation, a party whose presentation
was limited will invoke the draw out. Indeed, that is just what Pro-
fessor Dore predicted: “As a practical matter, an agency will be more
inclined to transform the information gathering hearing to accom-
modate specifically requested and adequately supported procedural
protections than it will be to grant a request for an adjudicatory
hearing.”210 This role has become even more important because the
Legislature made it very difficult to appeal directly due to the adop-
tion of the rule in 1992.211
The proposed change conforms the statute to the understanding
that others have of the way it should operate and encourages agen-
cies to use the remedy because, as amended, there will be no chance
that it will be interpreted to limit agency discretion. I oppose the
proposed change because I believe that it is not consistent with the
intent of the Act, which created a draw out to bring the adjudicatory
process set out in the Act to bear in the rulemaking process. Fur-
thermore, if the remedy is weakened to make it more acceptable to
                                                                                                                   
208. See Balino v. Department of HRS, 362 So. 2d 21, 25-26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Ma-
her, supra note 30, at 811 n.195 (“All the reported appellate decisions discussing the draw
out concern the agency’s refusal to convene draw out proceedings . . . .”). I have been a
persistent critic of the way the courts have responded to draw out requests, but Professor
Dore was generally supportive of the limiting construction given to the provision by the
courts. See id. at 809-10.
209. See Maher, supra note 30, at 805 n.173 (“Agency reluctance to grant a draw out is
traceable to its reluctance to share control over factfinding with DOAH and its reluctance
to provide the detailed explanations the draw out may require.”).
210. Dore, supra note 206, at 1008.
211. See FLA. STAT. § 120.543 (1997). For the history of this amendment, see Maher,
supra note 9, at 430-35.
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agencies, that weakening will remove the incentive agencies now
have to allow fuller presentations during regular rulemaking hear-
ings. Finally, the proposed change may not cause agencies to use the
amended draw out any more than they used the original version.
There will probably be debate on this issue next session.
C.   Another Proposal on the Stay as of Right
 Representatives of the Department of Business Regulation ad-
vanced a proposed amendment to section 120.60(5), Florida Statutes ,
that would have added the following sentence at the end of the sec-
tion:
All final orders entered pursuant to this section shall include a
finding as to whether the continued practice by the licensee pend-
ing appeal presents a probable danger to the health, safety and
welfare of the public and shall state with particularity the basis for
the agency’s finding.212
This section was advanced in an effort to save the changes made to
the stay as of right provision in 1996 from being removed and the
provision returned to its 1995 language.213
The proposed provision is objectionable because it will reduce
such findings to a boilerplate and will tend to make the finding of
danger to the public routine. In the last twenty-two years, such
findings have been rare. When licensing boards are called upon to
make such a finding at the same time they impose suspensions and
revocations, they may be reluctant to find that while such severe
discipline is warranted, no danger to the public is present. Yet this
type of finding was always intended to be rare. If every case resulted
in such a finding, no stay as of right would be granted.
On the positive side, the requirement of such a finding would
place the matter at issue from the beginning of a section 120.57(1)
proceeding. It would require evidence on this issue to be presented to
a DOAH administrative law judge (assuming that the agency con-
tended the licensee was a danger and he contested this fact; it would
then be a material issue of fact) and a finding of fact on the issue to
be made at DOAH. These would all be positive developments.
Those licensees who select section 120.57(2) proceedings may be
at a disadvantage under such a system because their cases are not
heard by DOAH. Perhaps a section 120.57(1) hearing right would be
triggered even in section 120.57(2) hearings if a finding of a danger
to the public is made over objection, because that would create a ma-
terial fact issue. However, that is not clear, and any future draft
                                                                                                                   
212. Draft, supra note 188, at 34.
213. See discussion supra Part III.D.1.
1998]                         1997 APA AMENDMENTS 273
should address such concerns if advocates of this position continue to
press it next session.
V.   CONCLUSION
The most radical reform in the administrative law area next ses-
sion would be to have no APA bill and no further reforms. The Legis-
lature should wait to see how the many changes made in 1996 are
working before it continues tinkering with the APA. It is too early to
assess the impact of those substantial changes on agencies and on
the constituents whose substantial interests are affected by them.
The Legislature should study the effect of the 1996 changes and see
whether the changes have the desired effect before it begins making
even more changes to the APA.
